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abstract
What is the relation between reasoning and self-knowledge? According to Shoemaker 
(1988), a certain kind of reasoning requires self-knowledge: we cannot rationally 
revise our beliefs without knowing that we have them, in part because we cannot see 
that there is a problem with an inconsistent set of propositions unless we are aware 
of believing them. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. A second account, 
versions of which can be found in Shoemaker (1988 and 2009) and Byrne (2005), 
claims that we can reason our way from belief about the world to self-knowledge about 
such belief. While Shoemaker’s “zany argument” fails to show how such reasoning can 
issue in self-knowledge, Byrne’s account, which centres on the epistemic rule “If p, 
believe that you believe that p”, is more successful. Two interesting objections are 
that the epistemic rule embodies a mad inference (Boyle 2011) and that it makes us 
form first-order beliefs, rather than revealing them (Gertler 2011). I sketch responses 
to both objections.
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Resumen
¿Qué relación existe entre el razonamiento y el autoconocimiento? Según Shoemaker 
(1988), cierto tipo de razonamiento depende de un autoconocimiento: no podemos 
revisar nuestras creencias racionalmente sin saber que las tenemos, en parte porque 
no podemos ver que la inconsistencia de un conjunto de proposiciones constituye 
un problema a menos que estemos conscientes de creerlas. En el presente artículo 
argumento que esta propuesta es errónea. Una segunda posición, versiones de la 
cual se pueden encontrar en Shoemaker (1988 y 2009) y Byrne (2005) proclama que 
es posible razonar desde creencias sobre el mundo hacia un autoconocimiento sobre 
tales creencias. Mientras el zany argument de Shoemaker no logra mostrar cómo 
tal razonamiento puede resultar en un autoconocimiento, la teoría de Byrne, que 
se centra en la regla epistémica “Si p, cree que crees que p” tiene más éxito. Dos 
objeciones interesantes son que la regla epistémica incorpora una inferencia insana 
(Boyle 2011) y que nos hace formar creencias de primer orden, en lugar de revelarlas 
(Gertler 2011). Esbozo respuestas a ambas objeciones.
 An earlier version of this text was presented at the Ninth Annual UT/UNAM 
Workshop on Reasons in San Antonio in 2014. I would like to especially thank Brian 
Cutter for acting as a commentator on that occasion. I am also very grateful for the 
stimulating discussion with the other participants of the workshop. Finally, I am 
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Byrne.
1. The problem of self-knowledge
Knowledge of at least some of one’s own mental states has two 
striking features. First, belief that one is in such a mental state is 
very likely to constitute knowledge; the possibility of error seems to 
be greatly reduced compared to belief about other people’s mental 
states or the world in general. Some philosophers have argued that we 
have infallible knowledge of these states: we cannot go wrong when 
we believe that we are in them. Others merely attribute an authority 
to them greater than that which we have when trying to find out what 
others’ mental states are. Here I shall only make the second claim. 
Although error is possible in beliefs about our own mental states, at 
least with respect to some of them the probability of such error is much 
lower than in belief about other people’s mental states.
Second, such knowledge is acquired in a special way, which 
seems to be “more direct” than the one we have for acquiring knowledge 
about other people’s mental states. Of course, more needs to be said 
about what this special way of acquiring self-knowledge is. Some ideas 
about this will be discussed in the third and fourth section of this text. 
To set up the problem of self-knowledge as I understand it, it suffices 
to agree that such knowledge is not acquired in the same way as we 
acquire knowledge about other people’s mental states. We do not need 
to observe ourselves or to draw elaborate inferences in order to know 
our own mental states. Furthermore, the way we have of knowing our 
mental states is not available for knowing the states of others.
Alex Byrne (2005) summarises these two features of self-
knowledge by saying that we have a “privileged” and a “peculiar” access 
to our own minds. He stresses that privilege and peculiarity can come 
apart. For example, our proprioceptive access to the position of our 
own limps might be thought to be peculiar, because not being available 
to others, but not privileged, because it can easily be erroneous. On the 
other hand, we might think of a scientist specialising in some area as 
having privileged access to facts in this area, without her access also 
being peculiar, i.e. more direct and not available to others.
The fact that knowledge of some of one’s own mental states 
exhibits both peculiar and privileged access is what I would like to 
call the problem of self-knowledge. We have some idea as to what 
makes beliefs about the world especially error-proof. If I want to be 
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sure about whether I still have some milk in the fridge, I examine the 
fridge. I look closer, from different angles, perhaps use sophisticated 
instruments such as microscopes, chemical analyses etc. to examine 
the contents of my fridge, back up my findings with tested theories or 
consult other experts on the matter. All these are ways of making my 
beliefs more error-proof. Some of them are also available if I want to 
have greater certainty about the mental states of other people. Perhaps 
there are no special instruments for finding out what someone else 
thinks. However, it is clear that I can improve my accuracy of mental 
state ascriptions to others by conversing with them, observing them 
carefully and consulting with others who know them well.
The problem of self-knowledge consists in the fact that our 
beliefs about some of our own mental states are highly error-proof 
despite only being based on a peculiar access. They are not based on 
close observation, backed up by theory, experiment or consultation 
with other experts; yet they are less prone to error than ordinary 
beliefs about the world and less prone to error than beliefs about 
other people’s mental states. How can this be, given that none of the 
elements that ordinarily make beliefs more error-proof seems to be 
present?
In this paper, I shall examine whether the problem of self-
knowledge can be explained by an appeal to features of our powers 
of reasoning. Sydney Shoemaker claims that self-knowledge is 
necessary for the kind of reasoning we engage in and understanding 
this necessity we might hope also to understand how it can combine 
privilege and peculiarity. Alex Byrne, on the other hand, tries to 
show that self-knowledge naturally arises out of ordinary powers 
of reasoning. Both kinds of argument have in common that they 
do not postulate an inner sense to explain self-knowledge. In what 
follows I evaluate these arguments and examine whether they help 
to solve the problem of self-knowledge. I will argue that Shoemaker’s 
arguments are inconclusive and cannot explain the problem. Byrne 
tackles the problem, but has difficulties explaining knowledge of one’s 
own standing states. Overall, I think that Byrne’s account is the more 
promising approach that should be further investigated. Throughout 
my discussion, I shall concentrate on the central case of knowledge of 
one’s own present beliefs.1
1 For self-knowledge to be privileged and peculiar, the beliefs known can be 
occurrent or dispositional, but they must be present states.
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2. shoemaker: reasoning requires self-knowledge
 One salient feature of our reasoning is that it is rational 
(in some sense to be defined). According to Sydney Shoemaker, such 
rationality is only possible if the reasoning subject has self-knowledge. 
I shall look at four versions of this argument.
The first version says, “[d]eliberation is a self-critical enterprise. 
One’s beliefs, desires and intentions are up for review, and for this 
to occur one must not only have them but be aware of having them.” 
(Shoemaker 1988, p. 187) So here, the rationality of our reasoning is 
seen as residing in our ability to review our own beliefs, desires and 
intentions. The argument then seems to rely on the idea that one cannot 
revise what one does not know one has. I shall not dwell on the point 
that one might revise things, such as other people’s cupboards, without 
“having” them in the sense one has beliefs. More importantly, it is not 
clear that one can only revise knowing that one has the thing revised. 
It seems that there are many corporeal facts, such as one’s pulse, rate 
of glucose in the blood, tension of various muscles etc., that are under 
our “revision”, without us being aware of them. Of course, Shoemaker is 
talking about the revision of mental states, not the states of such “lower” 
organs. Does this make a difference? Suppose I notice that it has started 
to hail and against my earlier intentions I decide not to go for a walk. 
Nowhere in this simple revision of beliefs and intentions does it seem 
necessary to self-ascribe these states. It seems that animals such as 
cats and dogs should be able to perform such forms of reasoning; yet we 
probably do not consider them capable of self-knowledge. Therefore, it is 
unclear why we might not revise beliefs, desires and intentions in some 
kind of automatic way, without being aware of having them.2
2 Shoemaker concedes at several points (Shoemaker 1994, pp. 285f.; 2003, p. 399; 
2009, p. 39) that some rational revision of beliefs and desires might go on automatically, 
but insists that there “are cases in which the revision of the belief system requires 
an investigation on the part of the subject, one that involves conducting experiments, 
collecting data relevant to certain issues, or initiating reasoning aimed at answering 
certain questions” (Shoemaker 2009, p. 39) and in these cases he thinks that self-
knowledge is necessary for the investigation. I think that Shoemaker is right in that 
our scientific investigation, for example, explicitly proceeds with the help of second-
order knowledge of objectives (intentions), of what is known or surmised (beliefs), of 
theories under consideration, etc. However, I have two questions: (1) Is it necessary 
for such investigation to rely on second-order knowledge? (2) The second-order 
knowledge that scientific research uses is fixed in notes or publications. It is clearly 
not of the peculiar kind and it might be privileged only in a select few specialists. So is 
it necessary for any investigation to rely on the peculiar and privileged self-knowledge 
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The second version of the argument runs as follows:
Suppose that one’s standing beliefs include the belief that P and the 
belief that if P then Q, and that one now comes up against evidence 
that Q is false. To see that there is a problem here that calls for 
resolution, it is not enough to be aware that the propositions “P,” “If 
P, then Q,” and “Not-Q” form an inconsistent triad; one must also be 
aware that these are all propositions one believes or is disposed to 
believe or has prima facie reason to believe. (Shoemaker 1988, p. 187)
Here, the idea seems to be that an inconsistency among a set 
of propositions is only a problem for me if I know that I believe them 
(or am disposed to believe them or have prima facie reason to believe 
them). After all, if I do not believe them the coherence of my beliefs is 
not threatened by this particular inconsistency.
However, this second claim (if I do not believe the set of 
inconsistent propositions the coherence of my beliefs is not threatened) 
is no good reason for the first (such inconsistency is only a problem for 
me if I know that I believe those propositions). In general, the following 
argument is a non sequitur:
(1) P, only if Q
(2) Therefore, I can know that P, only if I know that Q.
Consider, for example:
(3) This figure is a circle, only if all its points are equidistant to a 
single centre point.
(4) Therefore, I can only know that this figure is a circle, if I know 
that all its points are equidistant to a single centre point.
(4) does not follow from (3). I can know that some figure is a circle, 
for example by comparing it with some sample, without knowing that 
its points are equidistant to a single centre point. Knowledge is not 
closed with respect to implications.
However, Shoemaker seems to suggest just such an argument:
(5) I only have a problem with the inconsistency of a set of 
which is our concern here? It is not clear to me that either of these questions has to 
be answered affirmatively.
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propositions, if I believe all the propositions of the set.
(6) Therefore, I can only know (“see”) that I have a problem with 
the inconsistency of a set of propositions, if I know that I 
believe all the propositions of the set.
(6) does not follow from (5).3 I would suggest that we could notice 
the problematic character (for us) of an inconsistent set of propositions 
without self-ascribing beliefs about those propositions. For this, it is 
sufficient to notice that there are good reasons for taking the propositions 
in question to be true and to notice that they are inconsistent. These 
facts, if noticed by us, indicate clearly that we have a problem. It is 
impossible for all the propositions to be true; therefore, our reasons 
for taking them to be true cannot be the whole story. We now know 
that we have to dig deeper if we want to know the truth of the matter. 
However, nowhere in this process do we need self-ascriptions of belief; 
and in this sense self-knowledge of our own beliefs is not necessary. In 
fact, even the earlier quote from Shoemaker suggests that it might be 
sufficient for us to be aware only that the propositions in question are 
ones that we have “prima facie reason to believe”. However, this is not 
self-knowledge of belief.4
Shoemaker’s third argument for the claim that rational reasoning 
requires self-knowledge has the form of a reductio:
Someone who had no idea what he believed could not entertain the 
possibility that any specific one of his beliefs was wrong, and could 
not be led by doing so to initiate activities aimed at testing that 
possibility. If such a person’s beliefs were inconsistent, and he were 
aware of the inconsistency between the propositions believed, he 
would have to think, incoherently, that the facts were inconsistent! 
(Shoemaker 1988, p. 187)
Let me ignore, for the moment, the idea that self-knowledge 
enables us “to initiate activities aimed at testing [the] possibility [that 
some belief we have is wrong]”. Shoemaker claims that if a person 
has inconsistent beliefs and becomes aware of the inconsistency 
of the propositions believed, and if, furthermore, she is not aware of 
3 The non sequitur from (5) to (6) is my suggested reconstruction of the argument 
in the quoted passage from Shoemaker. Other, more charitable, reconstructions might 
be possible.
4 I am suggesting that knowledge that one has reason to believe that p is not, in 
and of itself, knowledge that one believes that p.
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having these inconsistent beliefs, then she should think that the facts 
themselves are inconsistent. Since this conclusion is absurd and since 
we are able to recognise inconsistency among propositions we believe, 
we must have self-knowledge of these beliefs.5
 However, this argument seems to prove too much. Consider a 
dog expecting food when it hears some specific noise, say the rustling 
of the food bag. Let us assume that the dog’s expectations are then 
frustrated. Does this mean that the dog takes the facts themselves to be 
inconsistent? On the other hand, does it mean that it has self-knowledge 
of its beliefs, thus being able to change them? Shoemaker seems to be 
saying that a person cannot change her beliefs unless she knows that 
she has them. But more plausibly, if, say, I perceive that the key is not 
in the drawer, where I thought it to be, I simply lose my earlier belief 
and form a new one to the effect that it is not there.6 It is not clear 
why this change of belief should involve the self-ascription of beliefs. 
In general, it does not seem necessary to self-ascribe beliefs for asking 
oneself whether things really are as they have presented themselves 
to be until now. I can ask myself “Is the key really in the drawer?”, 
check the drawer and then form a new belief about the key. If I find 
that the key is not in the drawer, I can infer that, earlier, I had a false 
belief. However, this inference seems to be optional, not a necessary 
precondition of rationally changing one’s beliefs.
In his fourth argument, Shoemaker asks himself what the 
situation would be like if we reasoned without self-knowledge and 
claims that such a view would fail to account for the idea that we are 
epistemic agents:
[O]ne might try to view deliberation about what to believe as a 
battle between contending beliefs or inclinations to believe. If this 
were right, it would seem unnecessary that the deliberator should 
have knowledge of the contending beliefs and desires; he would 
merely be the subject of them, and the battleground on which the 
struggle between them takes place. But this model seems hopelessly 
unrealistic, in part because it leaves out entirely the role of the person 
as an agent in deliberation; it represents deliberation as something 
5 Louis Gallois (1996) employs a similar line of reasoning with the aim of justifying 
an Evansian procedure for self-ascribing beliefs, where we infer from the fact that p 
that we believe that p.
6 Why do I lose my earlier belief? I do not know. Thankfully, that is just how our 
belief-formation usually works. I lose my earlier standing belief that p, as soon as I 
form a new belief that not p in response to some new perception or other reasoning.
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that happens in a person, rather than as an intentional activity on 
the part of the person. (Shoemaker 1988, p. 186)
Suppose we accept this argument. As Shoemaker remarks, more 
argument is needed to show that being “an agent in deliberation […] 
essentially involves self-knowledge” (Shoemaker 1988, p. 186).7 However, 
it is also not so clear to me that the conception of the deliberator as 
the “battleground on which the struggle between [contending beliefs 
and desires] takes place” is completely misguided. In deliberation, we 
might intentionally direct our attention towards what we take to be 
facts and evidential relations. However, the crucial insights that change 
our beliefs do not seem to be intentional. That is why we have the 
perceptual metaphor of “insight”. Such “perception” might well be seen 
as something that happens to us, not something that can be intentionally 
formed or meaningfully “decided upon”. If this is correct, then it is the 
idea of agency in deliberation that is problematic, not the idea of the 
deliberator as a battleground of competing beliefs and desires.8
We have seen that Shoemaker proposes a number of different 
arguments to the effect that rational deliberation about what to believe 
requires knowledge of one’s own beliefs. All of these arguments can be 
doubted with good reason. Although we do have self-knowledge of our 
own beliefs, it is not clear that this is necessary for rational deliberation.
However, even if the arguments were successful in their own 
right, it seems to me that they would still contribute only very little 
to explaining the problem of self-knowledge as I have characterised 
it earlier. This is because Shoemaker’s arguments at best only show 
that we have self-knowledge. Given that we can rationally deliberate 
about what to believe, Shoemaker tries to show that we must have 
self-knowledge. However, his arguments do not tell us how such self-
knowledge is possible.9 In fact, it seems to me that they do not even show 
7 Shoemaker’s former student Richard Moran (2001) might be seen as developing 
this line of thought.
8 A fuller discussion of this point would have to give some account of how to 
understand our practice of evaluating a reasoner’s deliberation, without invoking the 
notion of agency. If the perceptual analogy is correct, blaming or praising a deliberator 
might be similar to blaming or praising someone for perceiving or failing to perceive 
something.
9 Was this a foregone conclusion? Why should the fact that self-knowledge is 
necessary contribute to an explanation of its possibility? Stoneham (1998), for 
example, gives an argument to the effect that self-ascriptions of belief are necessarily 
true – roughly, “I believe that p” must have at least all the consequences that “p” has, 
otherwise it would constitute a reason for changing the first-order belief and thus 
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that we must have self-knowledge of the kind described earlier. That is, 
they do not show that we must have a privileged and peculiar access 
to our own beliefs. Further argument would be needed to demonstrate 
that the self-knowledge supposedly necessary for deliberation is of the 
special kind described earlier.
3. shoemaker’s “zany argument”: reasoning from “p” to “i 
believe that p”
The arguments examined so far aim to show that one cannot 
reason rationally in the way we do without having self-knowledge. 
However, Shoemaker also proposes a different type of argument not 
to the effect that we must have self-knowledge. Instead, this “zany 
argument” (Shoemaker 2009, p. 37) aims to show how a subject with 
normal cognitive capacities and dependent on rational cooperation with 
other subjects can reason her way from first-order beliefs to true self-
ascriptions of these beliefs. Thus, self-knowledge is not shown to be 
necessary for rational deliberation, but shown to be a possible outcome 
of it. The idea is that someone with normal cognitive abilities, but – yet – 
without self-knowledge, could reason as follows:
p. Since p is true, it will, ceteris paribus, be in the interest of anyone 
to act on the assumption that p, if one is in circumstances (call these 
relevant circumstances) in which whether one so acts is likely to 
affect the satisfaction of one’s interests. To act on the assumption that 
p is to act as if one believes that p. And part of acting as if one believes 
that p is acting in ways that indicate to others that one believes that 
p; for given that p is true, it will be in anyone’s interest to act this 
way in relevant circumstances. So acting will help one enlist the 
aid of others who believe that p in the pursuit of one’s goals. Others 
who believe that p, and share one’s goals, will cooperate with one in 
ventures undertaken on the assumption that p, and since p is true 
such ventures will tend to be successful. Acting in ways that indicate 
be incompatible with it, which is absurd. This account, if true, could also contribute 
to understanding how such a self-ascription can enjoy peculiarity and privilege: it 
does not matter how the self-ascription comes about (peculiarity); it necessarily 
makes itself true anyway (privilege). This is not an account to be discussed here; but 
it serves to show that a theory that claims necessity for self-knowledge might well 
be thought to contribute to a better comprehension of the problem of self-knowledge 
as I have defined it at the outset. Alas, this is not the case with the four arguments 
of Shoemaker’s discussed here to the effect that reasoning requires self-knowledge.
42
análisis filosófico xxxViii nº 1 (mayo 2018)
Martin fricke
to others that one believes that p will include saying, in appropriate 
circumstances, that one believes that p. Since this applies to everyone, 
it applies to me. And since I am in appropriate circumstances, I should 
say that I believe that p. (Shoemaker 2009, p. 37)
As a result of going through this reasoning process, the subject 
will truthfully self-ascribe the belief that p and generally behave as if 
she believes that she believes that p. Everything will be as if she has 
self-knowledge and Shoemaker suggests that we should regard the 
subject as having self-knowledge.
If we accept this, we will certainly have an explanation of at least 
part of the peculiar character of self-knowledge. The reasoning process 
Shoemaker describes is available only for first-person ascriptions of belief. 
If p and if I am in relevant circumstances, I should say that I believe that 
p, because this is likely to be helpful in the pursuit of my goals. However, 
it will not per se be helpful also to say that some other person believes that 
p. The other person might not have access to the information that p and if 
she does not, it will be in the interest of everyone to act on the assumption 
that she does not. What the other person believes or not will have to be 
judged on the basis of observing her. By contrast, Shoemaker’s reasoning 
process does not rely on outward observation of oneself. Rather, it goes, 
only with the help of some general pragmatic considerations, directly 
from the first-order fact that p to the self-ascription of the belief that 
p. This explains peculiar access; the possibility of self-ascribing beliefs 
without recurring to the kind of evidence we would need for ascribing 
beliefs from a third-person perspective.10
 Next, we can ask whether the “zany argument” also explains 
privileged access. Is a self-ascription arrived at by the reasoning process 
Shoemaker describes more likely to constitute self-knowledge than 
an ascription of belief based on third-person evidence? It seems that 
more argument is needed to establish such a claim. It could be pointed 
out, for example, that Shoemaker’s reasoning process does not rely on 
perception. Therefore, it cannot go wrong in the way perceptually based 
ascriptions of belief can go wrong. Furthermore, it seems that the process 
does not depend on getting the facts about the world right. It might be 
10 One might hold that Shoemaker only explains part of what I have described as 
peculiar access because one might think that the access he describes is not sufficiently 
“direct”, proceeding, as it does, by way of an inference. However, Shoemaker certainly 
provides a reason for thinking that it is peculiar in the sense of being different from 
our access to other people’s mental states. This is at least one important aspect of 
peculiar access.
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that the subject is mistaken in thinking that p. Still, her going through 
Shoemaker’s process would produce a true self-ascription of belief. It 
might also be that the subject judges wrongly that the circumstances 
are “relevant”. They might not be in the sense that it does not matter in 
the circumstances whether anyone believes that p. None of this affects 
the truth of the resulting self-ascription of belief. We might say that 
the truth of such self-ascriptions of belief depends only on the subject’s 
capacity to hold on to her first-order belief content “p” and to redeploy it 
in the subsequent self-ascription (cf. Fricke 2009).
However, the “zany argument” faces some serious criticisms. To 
look at two of them, let me distinguish the following steps in Shoemaker’s 
argument:
(1) p
(2) In relevant circumstances, (i.e. in circumstances where it 
matters for the success of one’s actions whether or not p is 
true), it is in the interest of anyone to act on the assumption 
that p.
(3) To act on the assumption that p is to act as if one believes that 
p.
(4) Part of acting as if one believes that p is acting in ways that 
indicate to others that one believes that p.
(5) Acting in ways that indicate to others that one believes that 
p includes saying, in the appropriate circumstances, that one 
believes that p.
(6) Since I am in the appropriate circumstances, I should say that 
I believe that p.
My first worry is that proposition (3) is doubtful. Acting on the 
assumption that p is not the same as acting as if one believes that p, 
especially if this is supposed to include saying that one believes that 
p. For instance, it might be expedient to act on the assumption that a 
patient is infected with Ebola, where this means that she is put into the 
isolation unit of a hospital. Yet, one might not actually believe that she has 
Ebola, perhaps because the relevant tests have not yet been made. Here, 
it might be important both to act on the assumption that she is infected 
with Ebola and to make clear to others that one believes neither that she 
is nor that she is not. On the other hand, it might be that it is unlikely 
that the patient has Ebola, yet it is important, in the circumstances, to 
act on the assumption that she has it to make sure that there is no risk 
of further infection in the unlikely event that she does. Again, it might 
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be important to explain to others that one does not believe her to have 
Ebola, that one’s actions are only a precautionary measure.11
A second objection might be that even though it is a simple chain 
of reasoning, it is still far too complex to be thought to describe how we 
actually come to our self-ascriptions of belief. Some might even say that 
we make self-ascriptions without going through any prior reasoning. In 
reply to this objection, Shoemaker says that he does not hold “that we 
come to our self-ascriptions of belief by employing the zany argument. 
We do not come to them by employing any sort of reasoning.” (Shoemaker 
2009, p. 38) Shoemaker’s idea is that the “zany argument” only serves 
to “rationalise” our self-ascriptions of belief. This means that the subject 
does not actually go through the process of reasoning that supposedly 
leads to the self-ascriptions of belief. However, she is disposed to make 
such self-ascriptions on the basis of the premises of the “zany argument” 
and if she did go through the argument, she would arrive at the self-
ascriptions.
It seems to me that the idea of merely “rationalising” our 
dispositions (and capacities) for reasoning is problematic without 
further explanation. If we do not actually employ the reasoning process 
Shoemaker describes, how does it explain anything about our self-
ascriptions? Is the idea that at some earlier time we did use it and that, 
with time, it became automatic? On the other hand, is the idea that 
because it could be used, such dispositions are rational, hence useful 
and therefore became evolutionarily selected for? Without some such 
further explanation, the claim that an argument merely rationalises 
some behaviour, dispositions or capacities, but is not actually employed 
by the subject seems dubious to me. 
Perhaps the most serious objection is that the argument does not 
seem to give the subject self-knowledge. It leads to the subject making 
a self-ascription only in the sense of saying “I believe that p”, not in 
the sense of coming to believe that she believes that p. Thanks to the 
argument, the subject knows that, given the goals she pursues, it is 
expedient to affirm that she believes that p. However, this does not 
amount to genuine knowledge about herself. Knowledge about one’s 
beliefs is more than just being able to make a true utterance to the 
11 As a referee has pointed out to me, the Ebola case is not analogous with 
Shoemaker’s in that Shoemaker takes it to be a premise that p. So unlike in the 
Ebola case, there is no scenario where it could turn out that not p. This does not 
mean that my criticism of (3) is wrong, but it suggests that Shoemaker could avoid 
it by formulating his argument more carefully. Perhaps he should replace “act on the 
assumption that p” with “act such as to take into account that p”.
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effect that one has some belief. It is plausible, for example, that to know 
that one believes that p one must also believe that one believes that p. 
Yet, Shoemaker’s reasoning does not seem to lead to such second-order 
belief. The subject just comes to believe that she should say that she 
believes that p, not that she actually believes it. Perhaps Shoemaker 
is right in affirming that the subject’s behaviour, if guided by the “zany 
argument” is indistinguishable from ours with regard to expressions of 
self-knowledge. However, we might ask, as Byrne does in discussing a 
different version of the argument, “Why hasn’t Shoemaker just outlined 
a strategy for faking self-knowledge?” (Byrne 2005, p. 92)
Let me briefly look at an earlier version of Shoemaker’s argument. 
In “On Knowing One’s Own Mind” (Shoemaker 1988), he points out that 
a subject with normal cognitive and conceptual abilities should be able 
to recognise the awkwardness of uttering Moore-paradoxical sentences, 
i.e. sentences of the form “p, but I don’t believe that p”. Shoemaker 
characterises this awkwardness in pragmatic terms. Assertions, if 
sincere, express beliefs. Therefore, the first conjunct of the Moorean 
sentence, if asserted sincerely, expresses the subject’s belief that p. 
However, the second conjunct says that the subject does not have this 
belief. Therefore, the first conjunct expresses a belief whose existence 
refutes what the second conjunct says. This means that one could not 
hope to get one’s audience to accept the first conjunct as an expression of 
one’s belief and the second conjunct as true. However, it is the pragmatic 
purpose of assertions to be taken both as true and as expressions of 
the utterer’s beliefs. Since Moore-paradoxical sentences cannot be taken 
both as true and as expressions of the subject’s belief, asserting them is 
self-defeating. All this should be evident to anyone with normal cognitive 
and conceptual capacities. Therefore, anyone with such capacities 
should both be puzzled when hearing others utter Moore-paradoxical 
sentences and avoid uttering such sentences herself. However, avoiding 
Moore-paradoxical sentences, while still making assertions about the 
world, can lead directly to self-ascriptions of belief. The reasoning could 
go like this:
(1) p
(2) In relevant circumstances (where it matters for the success of 
my actions whether or not p is true), I should say/assent to “p”.
(3) One should never assert a sentence of the form “x, but I don’t 
believe that x”.
(4) In relevant circumstances, I must not assert “p, but I don’t 
believe that p”.
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(5) In relevant circumstances, I must not assert “I don’t believe 
that p”.
(6) In relevant circumstances, I must not deny “I believe that p”.
(7) In relevant circumstances, I should say/assent to “I believe 
that p”.
The first premise and conclusion of this argument are the same as 
in the earlier one. However, where the earlier argument said, in essence, 
“If p and if this helps to advance the realisation of your goals, say ‘I 
believe that p’”, the argument from Moore’s Paradox gives the subject 
a more specific reason for assenting to “I believe that p”. The reason is 
that if you are disposed to assert that p, then it is pragmatically self-
defeating not to be prepared to assert, “I believe that p” as well. Unlike 
in the first argument, here the assertion “I believe that p” is not just a 
trick to get others to believe something that helps me along with my 
goals. Rather, it is an utterance that I have to be prepared to make in 
order to be coherent in what I say. Therefore, I think the argument from 
Moore’s Paradox is somewhat more convincing. However, it is zany all 
the same in that it does not lead to genuine self-knowledge, but only to 
a belief about what I should be prepared to say.12
We have seen that Shoemaker’s “zany argument” would explain, if 
successful,  how peculiar and privileged access could go together in self-
knowledge. The argument connects the premise “p” and the conclusion 
“I believe that p” with the help of pragmatic considerations about how 
to further one’s goals or avoid incoherence in one’s utterances. As the 
argument is unsuccessful, it might be useful to examine so-called 
transparency theories of mind, which attempt to connect the two 
propositions in a more direct way.
4. Byrne’s transparency theory: inferring “i believe that p” 
from “p”
Transparency theories of self-knowledge (especially those that 
focus on knowledge of one’s own beliefs) take their inspiration from a 
remark of Gareth Evans’s:
[I]n making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or 
occasionally literally, directed outward – upon the world. If someone 
12 I have discussed the argument from Moore’s Paradox in somewhat greater de-
tail in Fricke (2012).
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asks me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’, I must 
attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena 
as I would attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be 
a third world war?’ I get myself in a position to answer the question 
whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure 
I have for answering the question whether p. (Evans 1982, p. 225)
Evans observes here that we do not inspect inner items and 
examine what contents they have when we try to answer questions 
about our beliefs. Rather, we think about the world and our thinking 
about the world reveals to us what it is that we believe. Therefore, we 
might say that self-knowledge is transparent to a consideration of the 
world or, as Richard Moran puts it:
[A] first-person present-tense question about one’s belief is answered 
by reference to (or consideration of) the same reasons that would 
justify an answer to the corresponding question about the world. 
(Moran 2001, p. 62)
So how could the idea of transparency help us to explain the 
problem of self-knowledge? In what follows I shall briefly look at the 
theory proposed by Alex Byrne.
Byrne interprets Evans as saying that we come to our self-
ascriptions of belief through a process of reasoning. We infer from the 
fact that p that we believe that p. Such reasoning can be interpreted as 
following an epistemic rule that has this form:
(BEL) If p, believe that you believe that p (Byrne 2005, p. 94)
Byrne stipulates that we follow an epistemic rule of the form 
‘If conditions C obtain, believe that p’ if and only if we believe that p 
because we recognise that conditions C obtain. Therefore, following 
(BEL) requires recognising that p and inferring from this fact that one 
believes that p. Byrne also uses Gallois’s “doxastic schema” to describe 
the rule for this inference:
 p
 _______________
 So, I believe p
 (Gallois 1996, p. 46; cf. also Byrne 2011b, p. 204f.)
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It is immediately obvious that such an inference is not valid. The 
premise does not even make the conclusion particularly probable. So 
why should it be thought that this epistemic rule/inference schema can 
help us explain self-knowledge?
Byrne’s general attitude to this question seems to be that the 
success of the rule in bringing about true self-ascriptions of mental 
states is sufficient to justify its peculiarities. Using the rule requires 
recognising that p. However, recognising that p is, or involves, forming 
or retrieving the belief that p. So if someone recognises that the 
antecedent conditions of the rule obtain, i.e. if she recognises that p, 
then she believes that p. It follows that the self-ascription which results 
from an application of the rule is true.
Does the rule explain the peculiarity of our access to our own 
beliefs? It does, because applying the rule does not require observing 
oneself or otherwise gathering evidence about oneself from which one 
could conclude what one’s beliefs are. It can do without most of the 
elements that would make our ascriptions of beliefs to other people 
reliable. It just involves a direct inference from a fact that does not even 
need to be about oneself to a self-ascription of belief. Moreover, it is a 
rule only for oneself and one’s own beliefs. It does not yield knowledge 
of other people’s beliefs.13
Does the rule also explain why we are privileged in our access to 
our own beliefs? We have already seen that correctly applying the rule 
requires recognising that p and that this entails that the resulting self-
ascription is true. There is no equivalent rule for ascribing beliefs to 
other people. Consider (BEL-3):
(BEL-3) If p, believe that Fred believes that p (Byrne 2005, p. 96)
Even if I correctly apply this rule, i.e. I recognise that p, it is far 
from guaranteed that the resulting belief ascription turns out correct. 
I would not dismiss (BEL-3) completely (classify it as a bad rule, as 
Byrne seems inclined to do), because it expresses a kind of charitable 
default assumption that other people, largely, have the same beliefs as 
I do. However, it is clear that (BEL-3), even if applied correctly, will 
often result in false ascriptions of belief to Fred. Of course, in general, 
ascriptions of belief to other people often rely on observation, theories 
13 Perhaps using (BEL) is not a direct or immediate way of acquiring knowledge of 
one’s own beliefs. However, not relying on perception, it does seem to be more direct 
than the acquisition of knowledge of other people’s beliefs. 
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and, possibly, more complex inferences. By contrast, (BEL) does not 
require observation, theoretical knowledge or substantive inferences. 
As far as it does not, there are fewer possibilities for self-ascriptions of 
belief based on (BEL) to go wrong.
Byrne points out, furthermore, that I do not even have to apply 
(BEL) correctly in order to arrive at a true belief-ascription. I might 
be wrong in thinking that p. Therefore, I do not actually satisfy the 
antecedent condition of the epistemic rule. If I still use the rule to form 
the belief that I believe that p, Byrne says that I have merely tried to 
follow (BEL), but failed to recognise an antecedent condition. However, 
even merely trying to follow (BEL) in this sense still produces true self-
ascriptions of belief. Even if I am mistaken in thinking that p, if on 
the basis of this supposed fact I conclude that I believe that p I will be 
making a true self-ascription of a false belief. Byrne describes epistemic 
rules where this is the case as “strongly self-verifying”.14
Finally, we might also point out that the only capacity necessary 
in order to arrive at a true self-ascription of belief using (BEL) is to be 
able to hold onto and redeploy a thought content. We must not let our 
thought content “p” transform into some other content when we prefix 
it with “I believe that”. Other than this capacity, we do not need any 
further perceptual or inferential skills (cf. Fricke 2009).
We should note that if (BEL) correctly describes our method for 
self-ascribing beliefs, then it is possible to have beliefs without knowing 
that one has them. (BEL) might simply not have been applied to them 
yet. It should also be possible for self-ascriptions to fail. (BEL) is simple 
and not subject to errors that can occur in other-ascriptions of belief. 
However, this does not mean that there is no room for error at all. For 
whatever reason, the thought content of the first-order belief “p” might 
be corrupted on its way to being redeployed in a self-ascription of belief, 
which would then turn out to be false.15 (That such false self-ascriptions 
might in turn have a habit of bringing about the first-order belief that 
14 The following is an epistemic rule that is only self-verifying, but not strongly 
so: “(KNOW) If p, believe that you know that p”. Following (KNOW) and correctly 
recognising that p makes it true that one knows that p. However, merely trying to 
follow (KNOW), where one fails to recognise a true fact that p, will not lead to true 
self-ascriptions of knowledge. (Cf. e.g. Byrne 2011b, p. 206)
15 In the doxastic schema, the subject would start with the premise p, but then 
draw the false conclusion “I believe that q”. She fails to hold on to the content of her 
premise. This might seem contrived, especially for simple propositions. However, it 
is hard to see why it should be impossible. It would represent a failure of a capacity 
basic for drawing inferences and, in this sense, a failure of rationality. (Cf. Fricke 
2009, p. 8)
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they falsely ascribe and thereby a habit of becoming true after all, is 
another story.16)
A further remark is that an account of self-knowledge based 
on (BEL) does not stipulate special faculties, such as an inner sense. 
Ordinary reasoning capacities in combination with (BEL) should 
be enough to produce self-knowledge. In this respect, the account 
avoids making claims that Byrne labels as “extravagant”; instead, it 
is “economical”. If correct, certain partial cognitive failures, such as a 
failing uniquely of self-knowledge, because some inner sense ceases 
working, while all other cognitive capacities remain functioning, would 
seem to be unlikely.17
I should like to mention two interesting criticisms of Byrne’s 
theory. First Matthey Boyle has characterised the inference from “p” to 
“I believe that p”, which is implicit in Byrne’s epistemic rule (BEL), as 
“mad” (Boyle 2011, p. 230):
To believe that I believe P is to hold it true that I believe P. Being a 
reflective person, I can ask myself what grounds I have for holding 
this true. The answer ‘P’ is obviously irrelevant. I am asking what 
shows that the proposition I believe P is true, and a modicum of 
rational insight will inform me that, even if it is true that P, this by 
itself has no tendency to show that I believe it. (Boyle 2011, p. 230)
Boyle’s view is that an inference is not just “a reliable tendency to 
pass from one believed content to another” (Boyle 2011, p. 231). Rather, 
the premises of the inference must in some sense show the truth of 
the conclusion. Clearly, this is not the case when we pass from “p” to “I 
16 Cf. Stoneham (1998) for a theory according to which sincere self-ascriptions of 
belief necessarily make themselves true. His theory lacks an account of how these 
self-ascriptions come about in such a way as to cohere with our pre-existing beliefs. In 
this, it might be complemented by a transparency theory of self-knowledge.
17 As I said in the introduction, throughout this text I concentrate on the central 
case of knowledge of one’s own beliefs. I should mention, however, that Byrne makes a 
considerable effort to generalise his account to cover knowledge of one’s own intentions 
(2011b), visual perceptions (2012a), desires (2012b) and current thoughts (2011a). In 
all these cases, Byrne suggests that there are inferential schemas (or epistemic rules) 
similar to (BEL) that enable us to acquire self-knowledge in a peculiar and privileged 
way. However, this is not to say that in each case the privilege (the comparative error-
proofness) exists to the same degree as in the case of knowledge of belief. Byrne 
acknowledges that the inferential schemas for acquiring knowledge of one’s own 
intentions and desires, for example, are defeasible by additional knowledge in ways 
that (BEL) is not.
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believe that p”. One consequence of this view is that even if I followed 
the epistemic rule (BEL) and thus formed a self-ascription of belief, I 
should – if I subsequently reflect on the self-ascription – abandon the 
self-ascription for not being well supported:
[A] belief, once formed, doesn’t just sit there like a stone. What I 
believe is what I hold true, and to hold something true is to be in 
a sustained condition of finding persuasive a certain view about 
what is the case. Even if we grant that a disposition to pass from 
one content to another could deposit various arbitrary beliefs in my 
mind, those beliefs would be unsustainable if I, understanding their 
contents, could see no reasonable basis for holding them true. (Boyle 
2011, p. 231)
This criticism puts a strong internalist constraint on the 
formation of second-order beliefs. If there is a basis on which a rational 
person forms a belief about her beliefs, then it must be a basis that 
shows to the subject that the second-order belief is true.
Boyle’s own account shows that it is difficult to find such a basis. 
His solution is the claim that first-order beliefs from the very beginning 
go together with second-order knowledge that we have them. Such 
second-order knowledge is normally tacit. When we reflect on our first-
order states, it can become explicit in a self-ascription of belief. It is not 
clear whether the account proposed can avoid an infinite regress of ever 
higher-order tacit knowledge.
What are we to make of Boyle’s criticism? On the one hand, it 
might be responded that Boyle’s internalist constraint seems too strong, 
that we do not necessarily discard a belief that we find ourselves with 
just because we have nothing that shows its truth. On the other hand, 
it might also be responded that we do have an understanding of why 
(BEL) produces true self-ascriptions of belief: when something turns 
out to be true (in my view) then I form the belief that it is so. As far as 
I am rational, my finding something true is what makes me believe it. 
Therefore, the inference from what is true (when I answer this question) 
is bound to reveal what I believe.
The second objection to Byrne’s account is that his method for 
producing self-ascriptions of belief does not reveal first-order beliefs, but 
rather creates new first-order judgments. So even if the resulting self-
ascriptions of belief turn out to be true, they are so because we have 
made them so following (BEL), not because we have had the beliefs now 
self-ascribed all along.
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Brie Gertler (2011) has developed this objection in some detail. 
She points out, for example, that I may not have a belief as to whether 
p. If I now employ (BEL) to determine whether I believe that p or not, 
I will ask myself whether p is true. Here I might well come to form a 
belief as to whether p. Suppose I form the belief that p. Following (BEL) 
I will then proceed to the self-ascription “I believe that p”. This self-
ascription of belief will be true. However, it is true only because the first-
order belief was formed in response to the application of (BEL). (BEL) 
cannot reveal the absence of belief.
There might also be a problem with current beliefs. Suppose I try 
to use (BEL) to find out whether I currently believe that p. I proceed by 
asking myself whether p, find that it is indeed the case that p and then 
correctly self-ascribe this belief. The problem is that my asking myself 
whether p might be what prompts me, perhaps after a new examination 
of my available evidence, to form the belief that p. This might be so 
even though before applying (BEL) I did not believe that p or I believed 
that not p. Therefore, although the resulting self-ascription of belief is 
true, it does not reveal or detect a pre-existing current belief. Rather, it 
changes it, creates a new belief and self-ascribes it.
Suppose we wish to know whether we have a dispositional belief 
that p. Gertler points out that if we want to find out by using (BEL), we 
must take care not to change the dispositional belief by bringing in new 
evidence. Applying (BEL), we ask ourselves whether p. If we produce 
an answer by looking outward at the evidence we have now, we might 
come to a different answer than what we already believe dispositionally. 
Therefore, the application of (BEL) does not reveal the dispositional belief 
unless we restrain ourselves from taking into account new evidence. If 
we thus only rely on what we already have in the mind, the “internal”, 
our answer to the question of whether p might reflect our dispositional 
beliefs. However, it is only by concentrating on the internal and blocking 
external influences out that (BEL) can be made to reveal dispositional 
beliefs. This means that the application of (BEL) presupposes some sort 
of self-knowledge, namely regarding the distinction between what is 
“internally believed” and what is true in light of “external” influences, 
rather than just bringing self-knowledge about.
How serious is Gertler’s objection? It is clearly true that asking 
oneself whether some proposition is true can stimulate one to form a 
belief that one did not have before or to examine one’s evidence anew 
and change beliefs that one had until then. Therefore, if the application 
of (BEL) always requires asking oneself whether p is true, then it clearly 
is not a good method for revealing antecedent beliefs.
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However, it is not so clear to me that we necessarily have to conceive 
of the application of (BEL) in this way. If we have (BEL) at our disposal, 
this might simply mean that we have a tendency to infer from facts that 
we come across that we believe them. In other words, for (BEL) to be 
operative it is not necessary that one goes through a process of asking 
oneself some first-order question. It is sufficient for one simply to have 
a first-order belief. Having the first-order belief and having (BEL) as an 
epistemic rule at one’s disposal, one might then be disposed to self-ascribe 
the first-order belief by applying (BEL). Here, there is no prompting 
of an answer to a first-order question. It is simply that an inferential 
routine is available for execution. If we have self-knowledge that has 
not been acquired in response to some questioning (be it of first-order 
or second-order matters), then that might be because we went through 
the inferential routine described by (BEL) when a first-order belief was 
available for it. It seems that there is no reason to think that such self-
knowledge could not be of antecedently existing current or dispositional 
beliefs. – However, even such unprompted and unprompting use of (BEL) 
does not provide one with self-knowledge regarding the absence of beliefs. 
If we know that we do not have a belief on some subject, this knowledge 
must have come about through some method other than (BEL).
5. Conclusion
I have looked at three different conceptions of the relation between 
reasoning and self-knowledge. On the first conception, self-knowledge 
is a precondition for a specific kind of reasoning, namely for rational 
adjustment of one’s beliefs in light of new evidence or newly discovered 
relations of coherence. I have tried to show that the arguments for this 
kind of claim are inconclusive. It might well be possible rationally to 
adjust one’s beliefs in the way we do without ever self-ascribing them.
According to the second and third conception, we can reason from 
first-order beliefs to second-order beliefs. Shoemaker’s “zany argument” 
says that a subject who finds that p will, in relevant circumstances, also 
find it useful, for the realisation of her goals, to self-ascribe the belief 
that p. In another, more convincing, version, the argument says that a 
subject who finds that p and is disposed to assent to “p”, will realise that 
her own assertion will only be coherent if she is also disposed to assent 
to “I believe that p”. Both versions of the argument fail to bring about 
self-knowledge in the subject.
The third conception of the relation between reasoning and self-
knowledge claims that we might assume that we have an epistemic rule 
54
análisis filosófico xxxViii nº 1 (mayo 2018)
Martin fricke
at our disposal that permits a direct inference from first-order beliefs 
to self-ascriptions of these beliefs. Self-knowledge is then the product of 
reasoning with the help of this epistemic rule.
The first conception, even if it were true, would not contribute 
significantly to an explanation of the two characteristic and problematic 
features of self-knowledge: privileged and peculiar access. At best, it 
only establishes that we have self-knowledge; not how it is possible. 
The second and third conception do allow for an explanation of the two 
features of self-knowledge. On balance, and despite two interesting 
objections, the third conception seems to offer a more successful account 
of the problem of self-knowledge.
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